Daily Papers

Historically, artificial intelligence has drawn much inspiration from neuroscience to fuel advances in the field. However, current progress in reinforcement learning is largely focused on benchmark problems that fail to capture many of the aspects that are of interest in neuroscience today. We illustrate this point by extending a T-maze task from neuroscience for use with reinforcement learning algorithms, and show that state-of-the-art algorithms are not capable of solving this problem. Finally, we point out where insights from neuroscience could help explain some of the issues encountered.

Real-world robotic agents must act under partial observability and long horizons, where key cues may appear long before they affect decision making. However, most modern approaches rely solely on instantaneous information, without incorporating insights from the past. Standard recurrent or transformer models struggle with retaining and leveraging long-term dependencies: context windows truncate history, while naive memory extensions fail under scale and sparsity. We propose ELMUR (External Layer Memory with Update/Rewrite), a transformer architecture with structured external memory. Each layer maintains memory embeddings, interacts with them via bidirectional cross-attention, and updates them through an Least Recently Used (LRU) memory module using replacement or convex blending. ELMUR extends effective horizons up to 100,000 times beyond the attention window and achieves a 100% success rate on a synthetic T-Maze task with corridors up to one million steps. In POPGym, it outperforms baselines on more than half of the tasks. On MIKASA-Robo sparse-reward manipulation tasks with visual observations, it nearly doubles the performance of strong baselines. These results demonstrate that structured, layer-local external memory offers a simple and scalable approach to decision making under partial observability.

Modern vision models have achieved remarkable success in benchmarks where local features provide critical information about the target. There is now a growing interest in solving tasks that require more global reasoning, where local features offer no significant information. These tasks are reminiscent of the connectivity tasks discussed by Minsky and Papert in 1969, which exposed the limitations of the perceptron model and contributed to the first AI winter. In this paper, we revisit such tasks by introducing four global visual benchmarks involving path findings and mazes. We show that: (1) although today's large vision models largely surpass the expressivity limitations of the early models, they still struggle with the learning efficiency; we put forward the "globality degree" notion to understand this limitation; (2) we then demonstrate that the picture changes and global reasoning becomes feasible with the introduction of "visual scratchpads"; similarly to the text scratchpads and chain-of-thoughts used in language models, visual scratchpads help break down global tasks into simpler ones; (3) we finally show that some scratchpads are better than others, in particular, "inductive scratchpads" that take steps relying on less information afford better out-of-distribution generalization and succeed for smaller model sizes.

Transformer models underpin many recent advances in practical machine learning applications, yet understanding their internal behavior continues to elude researchers. Given the size and complexity of these models, forming a comprehensive picture of their inner workings remains a significant challenge. To this end, we set out to understand small transformer models in a more tractable setting: that of solving mazes. In this work, we focus on the abstractions formed by these models and find evidence for the consistent emergence of structured internal representations of maze topology and valid paths. We demonstrate this by showing that the residual stream of only a single token can be linearly decoded to faithfully reconstruct the entire maze. We also find that the learned embeddings of individual tokens have spatial structure. Furthermore, we take steps towards deciphering the circuity of path-following by identifying attention heads (dubbed adjacency heads), which are implicated in finding valid subsequent tokens.

Although large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable, these capabilities are unevenly distributed: they excel at formal linguistic tasks, such as producing fluent, grammatical text, but struggle more with functional linguistic tasks like reasoning and consistent fact retrieval. Inspired by neuroscience, recent work suggests that to succeed on both formal and functional linguistic tasks, LLMs should use different mechanisms for each; such localization could either be built-in or emerge spontaneously through training. In this paper, we ask: do current models, with fast-improving functional linguistic abilities, exhibit distinct localization of formal and functional linguistic mechanisms? We answer this by finding and comparing the "circuits", or minimal computational subgraphs, responsible for various formal and functional tasks. Comparing 5 LLMs across 10 distinct tasks, we find that while there is indeed little overlap between circuits for formal and functional tasks, there is also little overlap between formal linguistic tasks, as exists in the human brain. Thus, a single formal linguistic network, unified and distinct from functional task circuits, remains elusive. However, in terms of cross-task faithfulness - the ability of one circuit to solve another's task - we observe a separation between formal and functional mechanisms, suggesting that shared mechanisms between formal tasks may exist.

Attending to what is relevant is fundamental to both the mammalian brain and modern machine learning models such as Transformers. Yet, determining relevance remains a core challenge, traditionally offloaded to learning algorithms like backpropagation. Inspired by recent cellular neurobiological evidence linking neocortical pyramidal cells to distinct mental states, this work shows how models (e.g., Transformers) can emulate high-level perceptual processing and awake thought (imagination) states to pre-select relevant information before applying attention. Triadic neuronal-level modulation loops among questions (Q), clues (keys, K), and hypotheses (values, V) enable diverse, deep, parallel reasoning chains at the representation level and allow a rapid shift from initial biases to refined understanding. This leads to orders-of-magnitude faster learning with significantly reduced computational demand (e.g., fewer heads, layers, and tokens), at an approximate cost of O(N), where N is the number of input tokens. Results span reinforcement learning (e.g., CarRacing in a high-dimensional visual setup), computer vision, and natural language question answering.

Despite their remarkable success in language modeling, transformers trained to predict the next token in a sequence struggle with long-term planning. This limitation is particularly evident in tasks requiring foresight to plan multiple steps ahead such as maze navigation. The standard next single token prediction objective, however, offers no explicit mechanism to predict multiple steps ahead - or revisit the path taken so far. Consequently, in this work we study whether explicitly predicting multiple steps ahead (and backwards) can improve transformers' maze navigation. We train parameter-matched transformers from scratch, under identical settings, to navigate mazes of varying types and sizes with standard next token prediction and MLM-U, an objective explicitly predicting multiple steps ahead and backwards. We find that MLM-U considerably improves transformers' ability to navigate mazes compared to standard next token prediction across maze types and complexities. We also find MLM-U training is 4x more sample efficient and converges 2x faster in terms of GPU training hours relative to next token training. Finally, for more complex mazes we find MLM-U benefits from scaling to larger transformers. Remarkably, we find transformers trained with MLM-U outperform larger transformers trained with next token prediction using additional supervision from A* search traces. We hope these findings underscore the promise of learning objectives to advance transformers' capacity for long-term planning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in language processing, yet they often struggle with tasks requiring genuine visual spatial reasoning. In this paper, we introduce a novel two-stage training framework designed to equip standard LLMs with visual reasoning abilities for maze navigation. First, we leverage Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) on a curated dataset of tokenized maze representations to teach the model to predict step-by-step movement commands. Next, we apply Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO)-a technique used in DeepSeekR1-with a carefully crafted reward function to refine the model's sequential decision-making and encourage emergent chain-of-thought behaviors. Experimental results on synthetically generated mazes show that while a baseline model fails to navigate the maze, the SFT-trained model achieves 86% accuracy, and further GRPO fine-tuning boosts accuracy to 93%. Qualitative analyses reveal that GRPO fosters more robust and self-corrective reasoning, highlighting the potential of our approach to bridge the gap between language models and visual spatial tasks. These findings offer promising implications for applications in robotics, autonomous navigation, and other domains that require integrated visual and sequential reasoning.

When studying unconstrained behaviour and allowing mice to leave their cage to navigate a complex labyrinth, the mice exhibit foraging behaviour in the labyrinth searching for rewards, returning to their home cage now and then, e.g. to drink. Surprisingly, when executing such a ``home run'', the mice do not follow the exact reverse path, in fact, the entry path and home path have very little overlap. Recent work proposed a hierarchical active inference model for navigation, where the low level model makes inferences about hidden states and poses that explain sensory inputs, whereas the high level model makes inferences about moving between locations, effectively building a map of the environment. However, using this ``map'' for planning, only allows the agent to find trajectories that it previously explored, far from the observed mice's behaviour. In this paper, we explore ways of incorporating before-unvisited paths in the planning algorithm, by using the low level generative model to imagine potential, yet undiscovered paths. We demonstrate a proof of concept in a grid-world environment, showing how an agent can accurately predict a new, shorter path in the map leading to its starting point, using a generative model learnt from pixel-based observations.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is often credited with improving language model reasoning and generalization at the expense of degrading memorized knowledge. We challenge this narrative by observing that RL-enhanced models consistently outperform their base and supervised fine-tuned (SFT) counterparts on pure knowledge recall tasks, particularly those requiring traversal of hierarchical, structured knowledge (e.g., medical codes). We hypothesize these gains stem not from newly acquired data, but from improved procedural skills in navigating and searching existing knowledge hierarchies within the model parameters. To support this hypothesis, we show that structured prompting, which explicitly guides SFTed models through hierarchical traversal, recovers most of the performance gap (reducing 24pp to 7pp on MedConceptsQA for DeepSeek-V3/R1). We further find that while prompting improves final-answer accuracy, RL-enhanced models retain superior ability to recall correct procedural paths on deep-retrieval tasks. Finally our layer-wise internal activation analysis reveals that while factual representations (e.g., activations for the statement "code 57.95 refers to urinary infection") maintain high cosine similarity between SFT and RL models, query representations (e.g., "what is code 57.95") diverge noticeably, indicating that RL primarily transforms how models traverse knowledge rather than the knowledge representation itself.

The quest for human imitative AI has been an enduring topic in AI research since its inception. The technical evolution and emerging capabilities of the latest cohort of large language models (LLMs) have reinvigorated the subject beyond academia to the cultural zeitgeist. While recent NLP evaluation benchmark tasks test some aspects of human-imitative behaviour (e.g., BIG-bench's 'human-like behavior' tasks), few, if not none, examine creative problem solving abilities. Creative problem solving in humans is a well-studied topic in cognitive neuroscience with standardized tests that predominantly use the ability to associate (heterogeneous) connections among clue words as a metric for creativity. Exposure to misleading stimuli - distractors dubbed red herrings - impede human performance in such tasks via the fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm. In cognitive neuroscience studies, such fixations are experimentally induced by pre-exposing participants to orthographically similar incorrect words to subsequent word-fragments or clues. The popular British quiz show Only Connect's Connecting Wall segment essentially mimics Mednick's Remote Associates Test (RAT) formulation with built-in, deliberate red herrings, which makes it an ideal proxy dataset to explore and study fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm from cognitive neuroscience in LLMs. In addition to presenting the novel Only Connect Wall (OCW) dataset, we also report results from our evaluation of selected pre-trained language models and LLMs (including OpenAI's GPT series) on creative problem solving tasks like grouping clue words by heterogeneous connections, and identifying correct open knowledge domain connections in respective groups. The code and link to the dataset are available at https://github.com/TaatiTeam/OCW.

This paper provides an overview of the techniques employed by Hibikino-Musashi@Home, which intends to participate in the domestic standard platform league. The team developed a dataset generator for training a robot vision system and an open-source development environment running on a Human Support Robot simulator. The large-language-model-powered task planner selects appropriate primitive skills to perform the task requested by the user. Moreover, the team has focused on research involving brain-inspired memory models for adaptation to individual home environments. This approach aims to provide intuitive and personalized assistance. Additionally, the team contributed to the reusability of the navigation system developed by Pumas in RoboCup2024. The team aimed to design a home service robot to assist humans in their homes and continuously attend competitions to evaluate and improve the developed system.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve strong performance on mathematical reasoning benchmarks, yet the mathematically meaningful skills underlying their reasoning remain underexplored. We introduce SHAPE, a framework that analyzes Chain-of-Thought (CoT) trajectories through two lenses developed in mathematics education: (1) semantic spaces: the model's evolving mathematical interpretations of a problem (e.g., algebraic, geometric), and (2) heuristics: the specific mathematical actions taken within those spaces (e.g., simplifying the problem, working backward). We first use SHAPE to analyze the reasoning patterns of various models. Our findings reveal that the mathematical heuristics employed by a model better explain final answer correctness than traditional CoT features. Furthermore, models are likely to reach correct solutions by concentrating their reasoning effort within a few semantic spaces rather than exploring many disparate ones -- a pattern consistent with human behavior. Next, we utilize the SHAPE lens to evaluate whether post-training truly enhances mathematical proficiency. We find that reinforcement learning induces mode-seeking in heuristic usage. Lastly, we post-train LLMs by promoting diverse heuristics and demonstrate its effectiveness in improving accuracy. Overall, SHAPE provides a theoretically-grounded diagnostic framework for decoding LLM reasoning and offers a new path toward post-training LLMs for math reasoning. The code for our model is available at https://github.com/holi-lab/SHAPE-of-CoT

A growing body of work makes use of probing to investigate the working of neural models, often considered black boxes. Recently, an ongoing debate emerged surrounding the limitations of the probing paradigm. In this work, we point out the inability to infer behavioral conclusions from probing results and offer an alternative method that focuses on how the information is being used, rather than on what information is encoded. Our method, Amnesic Probing, follows the intuition that the utility of a property for a given task can be assessed by measuring the influence of a causal intervention that removes it from the representation. Equipped with this new analysis tool, we can ask questions that were not possible before, e.g. is part-of-speech information important for word prediction? We perform a series of analyses on BERT to answer these types of questions. Our findings demonstrate that conventional probing performance is not correlated to task importance, and we call for increased scrutiny of claims that draw behavioral or causal conclusions from probing results.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have effectively improved their reasoning abilities, particularly on mathematical and logical problems that have verifiable answers, through techniques such as supervised finetuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL). Prior research indicates that RL effectively internalizes search strategies, enabling long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, with backtracking emerging naturally as a learned capability. However, the precise benefits of backtracking, specifically, how significantly it contributes to reasoning improvements and the optimal extent of its use, remain poorly understood. In this work, we systematically investigate the dynamics between SFT and RL on eight reasoning tasks: Countdown, Sudoku, Arc 1D, Geometry, Color Cube Rotation, List Functions, Zebra Puzzles, and Self Reference. Our findings highlight that short CoT sequences used in SFT as a warm-up do have moderate contribution to RL training, compared with cold-start RL; however such contribution diminishes when tasks become increasingly difficult. Motivated by this observation, we construct synthetic datasets varying systematically in the number of backtracking steps and conduct controlled experiments to isolate the influence of either the correctness (content) or the structure (i.e., backtrack frequency). We find that (1) longer CoT with backtracks generally induce better and more stable RL training, (2) more challenging problems with larger search space tend to need higher numbers of backtracks during the SFT stage. Additionally, we demonstrate through experiments on distilled data that RL training is largely unaffected by the correctness of long CoT sequences, suggesting that RL prioritizes structural patterns over content correctness. Collectively, our results offer practical insights into designing optimal training strategies to effectively scale reasoning in LLMs.

How do multimodal models solve visual spatial tasks -- through genuine planning, or through brute-force search in token space? We introduce MazeBench, a benchmark of 110 procedurally generated maze images across nine controlled groups, and evaluate 16 model configurations from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and Alibaba. GPT-5.4 solves 91\% and Gemini 3.1 Pro 79\%, but these scores are misleading: models typically translate images into text grids and then enumerate paths step by step, consuming 1,710--22,818 tokens per solve for a task humans do quickly. Without added reasoning budgets, all configurations score only 2--12\%; on 20times20 ultra-hard mazes, they hit token limits and fail. Qualitative traces reveal a common two-stage strategy: image-to-grid translation followed by token-level search, effectively BFS in prose. A text-grid ablation shows Claude Sonnet 4.6 rising from 6\% on images to 80\% when given the correct grid, isolating weak visual extraction from downstream search. When explicitly instructed not to construct a grid or perform graph search, models still revert to the same enumeration strategy. MazeBench therefore shows that high accuracy on visual planning tasks does not imply human-like spatial understanding.

We introduce CheeseBench, a benchmark that evaluates large language models (LLMs) on nine classical behavioral neuroscience paradigms (Morris water maze, Barnes maze, T-maze, radial arm maze, star maze, operant chamber, shuttle box, conditioned place preference, and delayed non-match to sample), spanning six cognitive dimensions. Each task is grounded in peer-reviewed rodent protocols with approximate animal baselines. The agent receives a unified system prompt with no task-specific instructions and must discover goals purely from ASCII text observations and reward signals, much like a rodent placed into an unfamiliar apparatus. We evaluate six open-weight LLMs (3B to 72B parameters) on text-based ASCII renderings and compare against both a random baseline and a graph-based reinforcement learning agent. Our best model (Qwen2.5-VL-7B) reaches 52.6% average success on ASCII input, compared to 32.1% for random agents and 78.9% for approximate rodent baselines. We find that (1) scaling beyond 7B yields diminishing returns, (2) longer context history degrades performance, (3) chain-of-thought prompting hurts rather than helps, and (4) a vision-language architecture provides an advantage at 7B but hurts at 32B. Because the same model's performance ranges from 20% to 57% depending on interface parameters alone, these results characterize the agent-plus-interface system, not the model in isolation. Under this unified zero-shot ASCII protocol, current open-weight LLM agents remain well below approximate rodent reference values, particularly on tasks requiring spatial navigation and within-trial state tracking.

Do large language models (LLMs) solve reasoning tasks by learning robust generalizable algorithms, or do they memorize training data? To investigate this question, we use arithmetic reasoning as a representative task. Using causal analysis, we identify a subset of the model (a circuit) that explains most of the model's behavior for basic arithmetic logic and examine its functionality. By zooming in on the level of individual circuit neurons, we discover a sparse set of important neurons that implement simple heuristics. Each heuristic identifies a numerical input pattern and outputs corresponding answers. We hypothesize that the combination of these heuristic neurons is the mechanism used to produce correct arithmetic answers. To test this, we categorize each neuron into several heuristic types-such as neurons that activate when an operand falls within a certain range-and find that the unordered combination of these heuristic types is the mechanism that explains most of the model's accuracy on arithmetic prompts. Finally, we demonstrate that this mechanism appears as the main source of arithmetic accuracy early in training. Overall, our experimental results across several LLMs show that LLMs perform arithmetic using neither robust algorithms nor memorization; rather, they rely on a "bag of heuristics".

One long-term goal of machine learning research is to produce methods that are applicable to reasoning and natural language, in particular building an intelligent dialogue agent. To measure progress towards that goal, we argue for the usefulness of a set of proxy tasks that evaluate reading comprehension via question answering. Our tasks measure understanding in several ways: whether a system is able to answer questions via chaining facts, simple induction, deduction and many more. The tasks are designed to be prerequisites for any system that aims to be capable of conversing with a human. We believe many existing learning systems can currently not solve them, and hence our aim is to classify these tasks into skill sets, so that researchers can identify (and then rectify) the failings of their systems. We also extend and improve the recently introduced Memory Networks model, and show it is able to solve some, but not all, of the tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in reasoning tasks with the development of prompting methods. However, existing prompting approaches cannot reuse insights of solving similar problems and suffer from accumulated errors in multi-step reasoning, since they prompt LLMs to reason from scratch. To address these issues, we propose \textit{Thought Propagation (TP)}, which explores the analogous problems and leverages their solutions to enhance the complex reasoning ability of LLMs. These analogous problems are related to the input one, with reusable solutions and problem-solving strategies. Thus, it is promising to propagate insights of solving previous analogous problems to inspire new problem-solving. To achieve this, TP first prompts LLMs to propose and solve a set of analogous problems that are related to the input one. Then, TP reuses the results of analogous problems to directly yield a new solution or derive a knowledge-intensive plan for execution to amend the initial solution obtained from scratch. TP is compatible with existing prompting approaches, allowing plug-and-play generalization and enhancement in a wide range of tasks without much labor in task-specific prompt engineering. Experiments across three challenging tasks demonstrate TP enjoys a substantial improvement over the baselines by an average of 12\% absolute increase in finding the optimal solutions in Shortest-path Reasoning, 13\% improvement of human preference in Creative Writing, and 15\% enhancement in the task completion rate of LLM-Agent Planning.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Not yet. We present SPACE, a benchmark that systematically evaluates spatial cognition in frontier models. Our benchmark builds on decades of research in cognitive science. It evaluates large-scale mapping abilities that are brought to bear when an organism traverses physical environments, smaller-scale reasoning about object shapes and layouts, and cognitive infrastructure such as spatial attention and memory. For many tasks, we instantiate parallel presentations via text and images, allowing us to benchmark both large language models and large multimodal models. Results suggest that contemporary frontier models fall short of the spatial intelligence of animals, performing near chance level on a number of classic tests of animal cognition.

Skillful mobile operation in three-dimensional environments is a primary topic of study in Artificial Intelligence. The past two years have seen a surge of creative work on navigation. This creative output has produced a plethora of sometimes incompatible task definitions and evaluation protocols. To coordinate ongoing and future research in this area, we have convened a working group to study empirical methodology in navigation research. The present document summarizes the consensus recommendations of this working group. We discuss different problem statements and the role of generalization, present evaluation measures, and provide standard scenarios that can be used for benchmarking.

Recent research developing neural network architectures with external memory have often used the benchmark bAbI question and answering dataset which provides a challenging number of tasks requiring reasoning. Here we employed a classic associative inference task from the memory-based reasoning neuroscience literature in order to more carefully probe the reasoning capacity of existing memory-augmented architectures. This task is thought to capture the essence of reasoning -- the appreciation of distant relationships among elements distributed across multiple facts or memories. Surprisingly, we found that current architectures struggle to reason over long distance associations. Similar results were obtained on a more complex task involving finding the shortest path between nodes in a path. We therefore developed MEMO, an architecture endowed with the capacity to reason over longer distances. This was accomplished with the addition of two novel components. First, it introduces a separation between memories (facts) stored in external memory and the items that comprise these facts in external memory. Second, it makes use of an adaptive retrieval mechanism, allowing a variable number of "memory hops" before the answer is produced. MEMO is capable of solving our novel reasoning tasks, as well as match state of the art results in bAbI.

We study the problem of jointly reasoning about language and vision through a navigation and spatial reasoning task. We introduce the Touchdown task and dataset, where an agent must first follow navigation instructions in a real-life visual urban environment, and then identify a location described in natural language to find a hidden object at the goal position. The data contains 9,326 examples of English instructions and spatial descriptions paired with demonstrations. Empirical analysis shows the data presents an open challenge to existing methods, and qualitative linguistic analysis shows that the data displays richer use of spatial reasoning compared to related resources.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

Classical models of memory in psychology and neuroscience rely on similarity-based retrieval of stored patterns, where similarity is a function of retrieval cues and the stored patterns. While parsimonious, these models do not allow distinct representations for storage and retrieval, despite their distinct computational demands. Key-value memory systems, in contrast, distinguish representations used for storage (values) and those used for retrieval (keys). This allows key-value memory systems to optimize simultaneously for fidelity in storage and discriminability in retrieval. We review the computational foundations of key-value memory, its role in modern machine learning systems, related ideas from psychology and neuroscience, applications to a number of empirical puzzles, and possible biological implementations.

A key requirement for the development of effective learning representations is their evaluation and comparison to representations we know to be effective. In natural sensory domains, the community has viewed the brain as a source of inspiration and as an implicit benchmark for success. However, it has not been possible to directly test representational learning algorithms directly against the representations contained in neural systems. Here, we propose a new benchmark for visual representations on which we have directly tested the neural representation in multiple visual cortical areas in macaque (utilizing data from [Majaj et al., 2012]), and on which any computer vision algorithm that produces a feature space can be tested. The benchmark measures the effectiveness of the neural or machine representation by computing the classification loss on the ordered eigendecomposition of a kernel matrix [Montavon et al., 2011]. In our analysis we find that the neural representation in visual area IT is superior to visual area V4. In our analysis of representational learning algorithms, we find that three-layer models approach the representational performance of V4 and the algorithm in [Le et al., 2012] surpasses the performance of V4. Impressively, we find that a recent supervised algorithm [Krizhevsky et al., 2012] achieves performance comparable to that of IT for an intermediate level of image variation difficulty, and surpasses IT at a higher difficulty level. We believe this result represents a major milestone: it is the first learning algorithm we have found that exceeds our current estimate of IT representation performance. We hope that this benchmark will assist the community in matching the representational performance of visual cortex and will serve as an initial rallying point for further correspondence between representations derived in brains and machines.

Animals ranging from rats to humans can demonstrate cognitive map capabilities. We evolved weights in a biologically plausible recurrent neural network (RNN) using an evolutionary algorithm to replicate the behavior and neural activity observed in rats during a spatial and working memory task in a triple T-maze. The rat was simulated in the Webots robot simulator and used vision, distance and accelerometer sensors to navigate a virtual maze. After evolving weights from sensory inputs to the RNN, within the RNN, and from the RNN to the robot's motors, the Webots agent successfully navigated the space to reach all four reward arms with minimal repeats before time-out. Our current findings suggest that it is the RNN dynamics that are key to performance, and that performance is not dependent on any one sensory type, which suggests that neurons in the RNN are performing mixed selectivity and conjunctive coding. Moreover, the RNN activity resembles spatial information and trajectory-dependent coding observed in the hippocampus. Collectively, the evolved RNN exhibits navigation skills, spatial memory, and working memory. Our method demonstrates how the dynamic activity in evolved RNNs can capture interesting and complex cognitive behavior and may be used to create RNN controllers for robotic applications.

Adaptive behavior often requires predicting future events. The theory of reinforcement learning prescribes what kinds of predictive representations are useful and how to compute them. This paper integrates these theoretical ideas with work on cognition and neuroscience. We pay special attention to the successor representation (SR) and its generalizations, which have been widely applied both as engineering tools and models of brain function. This convergence suggests that particular kinds of predictive representations may function as versatile building blocks of intelligence.

Large language models (LLMs) have rapidly evolved from text generators into powerful problem solvers. Yet, many open tasks demand critical thinking, multi-source, and verifiable outputs, which are beyond single-shot prompting or standard retrieval-augmented generation. Recently, numerous studies have explored Deep Research (DR), which aims to combine the reasoning capabilities of LLMs with external tools, such as search engines, thereby empowering LLMs to act as research agents capable of completing complex, open-ended tasks. This survey presents a comprehensive and systematic overview of deep research systems, including a clear roadmap, foundational components, practical implementation techniques, important challenges, and future directions. Specifically, our main contributions are as follows: (i) we formalize a three-stage roadmap and distinguish deep research from related paradigms; (ii) we introduce four key components: query planning, information acquisition, memory management, and answer generation, each paired with fine-grained sub-taxonomies; (iii) we summarize optimization techniques, including prompting, supervised fine-tuning, and agentic reinforcement learning; and (iv) we consolidate evaluation criteria and open challenges, aiming to guide and facilitate future development. As the field of deep research continues to evolve rapidly, we are committed to continuously updating this survey to reflect the latest progress in this area.

Can human reading comprehension be assessed from eye movements in reading? In this work, we address this longstanding question using large-scale eyetracking data over textual materials that are geared towards behavioral analyses of reading comprehension. We focus on a fine-grained and largely unaddressed task of predicting reading comprehension from eye movements at the level of a single question over a passage. We tackle this task using three new multimodal language models, as well as a battery of prior models from the literature. We evaluate the models' ability to generalize to new textual items, new participants, and the combination of both, in two different reading regimes, ordinary reading and information seeking. The evaluations suggest that although the task is highly challenging, eye movements contain useful signals for fine-grained prediction of reading comprehension. Code and data will be made publicly available.

While Transformers have enabled tremendous progress in various application settings, such architectures still lag behind traditional symbolic planners for solving complex decision making tasks. In this work, we demonstrate how to train Transformers to solve complex planning tasks and present Searchformer, a Transformer model that optimally solves previously unseen Sokoban puzzles 93.7% of the time, while using up to 26.8% fewer search steps than standard A^* search. Searchformer is an encoder-decoder Transformer model trained to predict the search dynamics of A^*. This model is then fine-tuned via expert iterations to perform fewer search steps than A^* search while still generating an optimal plan. In our training method, A^*'s search dynamics are expressed as a token sequence outlining when task states are added and removed into the search tree during symbolic planning. In our ablation studies on maze navigation, we find that Searchformer significantly outperforms baselines that predict the optimal plan directly with a 5-10times smaller model size and a 10times smaller training dataset. We also demonstrate how Searchformer scales to larger and more complex decision making tasks like Sokoban with improved percentage of solved tasks and shortened search dynamics.

Eleven Large Language Models (LLMs) were assessed using a custom-made battery of false-belief tasks, considered a gold standard in testing Theory of Mind (ToM) in humans. The battery included 640 prompts spread across 40 diverse tasks, each one including a false-belief scenario, three closely matched true-belief control scenarios, and the reversed versions of all four. To solve a single task, a model needed to correctly answer 16 prompts across all eight scenarios. Smaller and older models solved no tasks; GPT-3-davinci-003 (from November 2022) and ChatGPT-3.5-turbo (from March 2023) solved 20% of the tasks; ChatGPT-4 (from June 2023) solved 75% of the tasks, matching the performance of six-year-old children observed in past studies. We explore the potential interpretation of these findings, including the intriguing possibility that ToM, previously considered exclusive to humans, may have spontaneously emerged as a byproduct of LLMs' improving language skills.

One of the long-term challenges of robotics is to enable robots to interact with humans in the visual world via natural language, as humans are visual animals that communicate through language. Overcoming this challenge requires the ability to perform a wide variety of complex tasks in response to multifarious instructions from humans. In the hope that it might drive progress towards more flexible and powerful human interactions with robots, we propose a dataset of varied and complex robot tasks, described in natural language, in terms of objects visible in a large set of real images. Given an instruction, success requires navigating through a previously-unseen environment to identify an object. This represents a practical challenge, but one that closely reflects one of the core visual problems in robotics. Several state-of-the-art vision-and-language navigation, and referring-expression models are tested to verify the difficulty of this new task, but none of them show promising results because there are many fundamental differences between our task and previous ones. A novel Interactive Navigator-Pointer model is also proposed that provides a strong baseline on the task. The proposed model especially achieves the best performance on the unseen test split, but still leaves substantial room for improvement compared to the human performance.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

How does reinforcement learning shape a language model's internal representations? We present evidence that RL recruits a pre-existing representation of functional welfare: an estimate of how well or badly the system is doing, relative to its goals. We train several language models in a novel, semantically neutral maze environment. We then extract concept vectors for rewarded and punished trajectories, and evaluate those vectors in settings unrelated to the maze environment. The punishment vector behaves like a representation of negative welfare: it promotes failure and impossibility tokens, it aligns with negative emotion concepts, it negatively tracks goal-achievement, and steering with it induces negative self-reports, pathological backtracking, refusal, and uncertainty. The positive reward vector behaves as the mirror image, and the two are nearly antiparallel. These effects are robust when controlling for tile-to-reward mapping, scale, instruct tuning, RL training algorithm, model family, and LoRA versus full-finetuning, and largely persist when we replace RL with supervised fine-tuning. Importantly, the vectors are effective in models before they have undergone maze training. Combined with observations that the effects also appear in pretrain-only models, we therefore argue that this functional welfare axis pre-exists post-training: it is recruited, rather than created, by post-training. While we make no claims about any experience of welfare, the axis offers a demonstration that minimal reward signals can broadly affect model behavior by recruiting pre-existing welfare-like representations, with implications for interpretability, post-training dynamics, and alignment.

To act in the world, robots rely on a representation of salient task aspects: for example, to carry a cup of coffee, a robot must consider movement efficiency and cup orientation in its behaviour. However, if we want robots to act for and with people, their representations must not be just functional but also reflective of what humans care about, i.e. their representations must be aligned with humans'. In this survey, we pose that current reward and imitation learning approaches suffer from representation misalignment, where the robot's learned representation does not capture the human's representation. We suggest that because humans will be the ultimate evaluator of robot performance in the world, it is critical that we explicitly focus our efforts on aligning learned task representations with humans, in addition to learning the downstream task. We advocate that current representation learning approaches in robotics should be studied from the perspective of how well they accomplish the objective of representation alignment. To do so, we mathematically define the problem, identify its key desiderata, and situate current robot learning methods within this formalism. We conclude the survey by suggesting future directions for exploring open challenges.

Incorporating domain-specific priors in search and navigation tasks has shown promising results in improving generalization and sample complexity over end-to-end trained policies. In this work, we study how object embeddings that capture spatial semantic priors can guide search and navigation tasks in a structured environment. We know that humans can search for an object like a book, or a plate in an unseen house, based on the spatial semantics of bigger objects detected. For example, a book is likely to be on a bookshelf or a table, whereas a plate is likely to be in a cupboard or dishwasher. We propose a method to incorporate such spatial semantic awareness in robots by leveraging pre-trained language models and multi-relational knowledge bases as object embeddings. We demonstrate using these object embeddings to search a query object in an unseen indoor environment. We measure the performance of these embeddings in an indoor simulator (AI2Thor). We further evaluate different pre-trained embedding onSuccess Rate(SR) and success weighted by Path Length(SPL).

Language understanding entails not just extracting the surface-level meaning of the linguistic input, but constructing rich mental models of the situation it describes. Here we propose that because processing within the brain's core language system is fundamentally limited, deeply understanding language requires exporting information from the language system to other brain regions that compute perceptual and motor representations, construct mental models, and store our world knowledge and autobiographical memories. We review the existing evidence for this hypothesis, and argue that recent progress in cognitive neuroscience provides both the conceptual foundation and the methods to directly test it, thus opening up a new strategy to reveal what it means, cognitively and neurally, to understand language.

In the era of Large Language Models (LLMs), alignment has emerged as a fundamental yet challenging problem in the pursuit of more reliable, controllable, and capable machine intelligence. The recent success of reasoning models and conversational AI systems has underscored the critical role of reinforcement learning (RL) in enhancing these systems, driving increased research interest at the intersection of RL and LLM alignment. This paper provides a comprehensive review of recent advances in LLM alignment through the lens of inverse reinforcement learning (IRL), emphasizing the distinctions between RL techniques employed in LLM alignment and those in conventional RL tasks. In particular, we highlight the necessity of constructing neural reward models from human data and discuss the formal and practical implications of this paradigm shift. We begin by introducing fundamental concepts in RL to provide a foundation for readers unfamiliar with the field. We then examine recent advances in this research agenda, discussing key challenges and opportunities in conducting IRL for LLM alignment. Beyond methodological considerations, we explore practical aspects, including datasets, benchmarks, evaluation metrics, infrastructure, and computationally efficient training and inference techniques. Finally, we draw insights from the literature on sparse-reward RL to identify open questions and potential research directions. By synthesizing findings from diverse studies, we aim to provide a structured and critical overview of the field, highlight unresolved challenges, and outline promising future directions for improving LLM alignment through RL and IRL techniques.

Recent work in mechanistic interpretability has shown that behaviors in language models can be successfully reverse-engineered through circuit analysis. A common criticism, however, is that each circuit is task-specific, and thus such analysis cannot contribute to understanding the models at a higher level. In this work, we present evidence that insights (both low-level findings about specific heads and higher-level findings about general algorithms) can indeed generalize across tasks. Specifically, we study the circuit discovered in Wang et al. (2022) for the Indirect Object Identification (IOI) task and 1.) show that it reproduces on a larger GPT2 model, and 2.) that it is mostly reused to solve a seemingly different task: Colored Objects (Ippolito & Callison-Burch, 2023). We provide evidence that the process underlying both tasks is functionally very similar, and contains about a 78% overlap in in-circuit attention heads. We further present a proof-of-concept intervention experiment, in which we adjust four attention heads in middle layers in order to 'repair' the Colored Objects circuit and make it behave like the IOI circuit. In doing so, we boost accuracy from 49.6% to 93.7% on the Colored Objects task and explain most sources of error. The intervention affects downstream attention heads in specific ways predicted by their interactions in the IOI circuit, indicating that this subcircuit behavior is invariant to the different task inputs. Overall, our results provide evidence that it may yet be possible to explain large language models' behavior in terms of a relatively small number of interpretable task-general algorithmic building blocks and computational components.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks, raising expectations for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). This position paper argues that integrating explicit memory is the cornerstone for advancing LLMs toward AGI. The key reason is that the underlying learning mechanism of LLMs is highly analogous to human implicit memory. However, higher-order cognitive functions necessary for AGI, such as long-term strategic planning, metacognition, and symbolic reasoning, heavily rely on hippocampal explicit memory and cannot arise solely from implicit statistical learning. Drawing on findings from neuroscience, I advance this perspective and complement it with computational requirements for artificial explicit memory systems, hoping to foster further research and lay the groundwork for explicit memory integration.

Large language models fine-tuned on human behavioural data have emerged as general-purpose cognitive proxies, but the scale this requires, and whether these models process task structure or exploit statistical shortcuts, remain open questions. We train fourteen models from 135M to 14B parameters across four architecture families on Psych-101, a dataset of 10.7 million trial-level choices from 160 experiments. For in-distribution simulations, scale barely matters. The models fall within a narrow band, as though against a ceiling, and 0.6B to 1B parameters suffice to match a 70B baseline on held-out participants. Out-of-distribution, that band opens into a markedly steeper scaling gradient, with larger models clearly advantaged in generalisation to novel task structure. To determine what information these models use, we run two diagnostics. We progressively strip four prompt channels -- task instructions, experimental stimuli, outcome feedback, and choice history -- across 27 experiments, and permute trial order. Masking the content of stimuli and feedback destroys 75.7% of learned information and pushes models below chance, demonstrating that choice history alone does not account for performance. Permutation reveals invariance on tasks with independent trials but sensitivity where trial order is determined by prior responses. Small cognitively fine-tuned models therefore show promise as noise ceiling estimators for psychological experiments, though their scope remains bounded by the paradigms seen in training.

Recent studies in interpretability have explored the inner workings of transformer models trained on tasks across various domains, often discovering that these networks naturally develop highly structured representations. When such representations comprehensively reflect the task domain's structure, they are commonly referred to as "World Models" (WMs). In this work, we identify WMs in transformers trained on maze-solving tasks. By using Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) and analyzing attention patterns, we examine the construction of WMs and demonstrate consistency between SAE feature-based and circuit-based analyses. By subsequently intervening on isolated features to confirm their causal role, we find that it is easier to activate features than to suppress them. Furthermore, we find that models can reason about mazes involving more simultaneously active features than they encountered during training; however, when these same mazes (with greater numbers of connections) are provided to models via input tokens instead, the models fail. Finally, we demonstrate that positional encoding schemes appear to influence how World Models are structured within the model's residual stream.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

We introduce a new language learning setting relevant to building adaptive natural language interfaces. It is inspired by Wittgenstein's language games: a human wishes to accomplish some task (e.g., achieving a certain configuration of blocks), but can only communicate with a computer, who performs the actual actions (e.g., removing all red blocks). The computer initially knows nothing about language and therefore must learn it from scratch through interaction, while the human adapts to the computer's capabilities. We created a game in a blocks world and collected interactions from 100 people playing it. First, we analyze the humans' strategies, showing that using compositionality and avoiding synonyms correlates positively with task performance. Second, we compare computer strategies, showing how to quickly learn a semantic parsing model from scratch, and that modeling pragmatics further accelerates learning for successful players.

We develop information geometric techniques to understand the representations learned by deep networks when they are trained on different tasks using supervised, meta-, semi-supervised and contrastive learning. We shed light on the following phenomena that relate to the structure of the space of tasks: (1) the manifold of probabilistic models trained on different tasks using different representation learning methods is effectively low-dimensional; (2) supervised learning on one task results in a surprising amount of progress even on seemingly dissimilar tasks; progress on other tasks is larger if the training task has diverse classes; (3) the structure of the space of tasks indicated by our analysis is consistent with parts of the Wordnet phylogenetic tree; (4) episodic meta-learning algorithms and supervised learning traverse different trajectories during training but they fit similar models eventually; (5) contrastive and semi-supervised learning methods traverse trajectories similar to those of supervised learning. We use classification tasks constructed from the CIFAR-10 and Imagenet datasets to study these phenomena.

When do machine learning systems fail to generalize, and what mechanisms could improve their generalization? Here, we draw inspiration from cognitive science to argue that one weakness of machine learning systems is their failure to exhibit latent learning -- learning information that is not relevant to the task at hand, but that might be useful in a future task. We show how this perspective links failures ranging from the reversal curse in language modeling to new findings on agent-based navigation. We then highlight how cognitive science points to episodic memory as a potential part of the solution to these issues. Correspondingly, we show that a system with an oracle retrieval mechanism can use learning experiences more flexibly to generalize better across many of these challenges. We also identify some of the essential components for effectively using retrieval, including the importance of within-example in-context learning for acquiring the ability to use information across retrieved examples. In summary, our results illustrate one possible contributor to the relative data inefficiency of current machine learning systems compared to natural intelligence, and help to understand how retrieval methods can complement parametric learning to improve generalization.

Large language model (LLM) agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex decision-making and tool-use tasks, yet their ability to generalize across varying environments remains a under-examined concern. Current evaluation paradigms predominantly rely on trajectory-based metrics that measure task success, while failing to assess whether agents possess a grounded, transferable model of the environment. To address this gap, we propose Task-to-Quiz (T2Q), a deterministic and automated evaluation paradigm designed to decouple task execution from world-state understanding. We instantiate this paradigm in T2QBench, a suite comprising 30 environments and 1,967 grounded QA pairs across multiple difficulty levels. Our extensive experiments reveal that task success is often a poor proxy for environment understanding, and that current memory machanism can not effectively help agents acquire a grounded model of the environment. These findings identify proactive exploration and fine-grained state representation as primary bottlenecks, offering a robust foundation for developing more generalizable autonomous agents.

We have only limited understanding of how and why large language models (LLMs) respond in the ways that they do. Their neural networks have proven challenging to interpret, and we are only beginning to tease out the function of individual neurons and circuits within them. However, another path to understanding these systems is to investigate and develop their capacity to introspect and explain their own functioning. Here, we show that i) contemporary LLMs are capable of providing accurate, quantitative descriptions of their own internal processes during certain kinds of decision-making, ii) that it is possible to improve these capabilities through training, and iii) that this training generalizes to at least some degree. To do so, we fine-tuned GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini to make decisions in a wide variety of complex contexts (e.g., choosing between condos, loans, vacations, etc.) according to randomly-generated, quantitative preferences about how to weigh different attributes during decision-making (e.g., the relative importance of natural light versus quiet surroundings for condos). We demonstrate that the LLMs can accurately report these preferences (i.e., the weights that they learned to give to different attributes during decision-making). Next, we demonstrate that these LLMs can be fine-tuned to explain their decision-making even more accurately. Finally, we demonstrate that this training generalizes: It improves the ability of the models to accurately explain what they are doing as they make other complex decisions, not just decisions they have learned to make via fine-tuning. This work is a step towards training LLMs to accurately and broadly report on their own internal processes -- a possibility that would yield substantial benefits for interpretability, control, and safety.

How can we use AI to discover a new state of the art for a scientific problem? Prior work in test-time scaling, such as AlphaEvolve, performs search by prompting a frozen LLM. We perform reinforcement learning at test time, so the LLM can continue to train, but now with experience specific to the test problem. This form of continual learning is quite special, because its goal is to produce one great solution rather than many good ones on average, and to solve this very problem rather than generalize to other problems. Therefore, our learning objective and search subroutine are designed to prioritize the most promising solutions. We call this method Test-Time Training to Discover (TTT-Discover). Following prior work, we focus on problems with continuous rewards. We report results for every problem we attempted, across mathematics, GPU kernel engineering, algorithm design, and biology. TTT-Discover sets the new state of the art in almost all of them: (i) Erdős' minimum overlap problem and an autocorrelation inequality; (ii) a GPUMode kernel competition (up to 2times faster than prior art); (iii) past AtCoder algorithm competitions; and (iv) denoising problem in single-cell analysis. Our solutions are reviewed by experts or the organizers. All our results are achieved with an open model, OpenAI gpt-oss-120b, and can be reproduced with our publicly available code, in contrast to previous best results that required closed frontier models. Our test-time training runs are performed using Tinker, an API by Thinking Machines, with a cost of only a few hundred dollars per problem.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance by incorporating functional symbolic representations that abstractly describe graph traversal algorithms and step-by-step reasoning in few-shot learning settings. However, it remains unclear how LLMs genuinely understand the abstract meaning of each reasoning step and the overall algorithm from only a limited number of demonstrations. This work aims to localize the attention heads responsible for individual reasoning steps and characterize the types of information transferred among them. We first align constituent reasoning steps with their corresponding token logits under a symbolic-aided Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting framework. Our analysis shows that token positions that steer the reasoning process are associated with low confidence scores caused by constraints on satisfying reasoning behavior patterns in demonstrations. We then adopt causal mediation analysis techniques to identify the attention heads responsible for these patterns. In addition, our findings indicate that LLMs retrieve factual and rule-based information for individual sub-reasoning tasks through specialized attention heads (approximately 3% total heads), whereas higher layers predominantly facilitate information integration and the emergence of global reasoning strategies (e.g., graph traversal algorithms) that coordinate multiple intermediate reasoning steps to solve the overall task.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

The ability to achieve long-term goals is a key challenge in the current development of large language models (LLMs). To address this, pre-trained LLMs can be fine-tuned with reinforcement learning (RL) to explore solutions that optimize a given goal. However, exploration with LLMs is difficult, as a balance has to be struck between discovering new solutions and staying close enough to the pre-trained model, so as not to degrade basic capabilities. This is typically controlled with a Kullback-Leibler (KL) penalty. In this paper, we investigate the exploration dynamics of a small language model on a simple arithmetic task. We show how varying degrees of pre-training influence exploration and demonstrate the importance of "critical tokens" which have a dramatic impact on the final outcome. Consequently, we introduce a simple modification to the KL penalty that favors exploration on critical tokens, increasing the efficiency of the RL fine-tuning stage.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

Do brains and language models converge toward the same internal representations of the world? Recent years have seen a rise in studies of neural activations and model alignment. In this work, we review 25 fMRI-based studies published between 2023 and 2025 and explicitly confront their findings with two key hypotheses: (i) the Platonic Representation Hypothesis -- that as models scale and improve, they converge to a representation of the real world, and (ii) the Intermediate-Layer Advantage -- that intermediate (mid-depth) layers often encode richer, more generalizable features. Our findings provide converging evidence that models and brains may share abstract representational structures, supporting both hypotheses and motivating further research on brain-model alignment.

Long-term memory systems store what a user says in an external store and retrieve it when a related query arrives. This interface rests on an assumption so natural that it is rarely stated: a memory that is needed will resemble the query that needs it. World knowledge breaks the assumption. A tree-nut allergy should change the answer to a macaron request through their almond-flour ingredient, yet the two texts share no cue a retriever can see. We call this failure mode the implicit-association blind spot and introduce InMind, a 125-task, expert-verified benchmark spanning ten life domains, with 113 tasks grounded in citable public sources. Its paired controls separate three explanations that existing evaluations conflate: the fact was never stored, the model lacks the bridging knowledge, or the fact was stored and never surfaced. The verdict is clean. With the decisive memory placed in context, the backbone answers 84.0 percent of indirect queries; when the same memory must be retrieved, six vector, graph, and agentic memory systems reach at most 14.4 percent, even though they recall the same facts on demand at up to 100 percent. An embedding with eight times the dimensionality raises answer-blind target recall for every system yet leaves the gap essentially intact. A minimal diagnostic probe that keeps memory visible before the query arrives recovers most of the gap, locating the failure in the query-conditioned interface itself and pointing to routing, deciding which facts must stay visible, as the open problem InMind is built to score.

Language models have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various natural language processing tasks, yet they struggle with planning tasks requiring multi-step simulations. Inspired by human cognitive processes, this paper investigates the optimal planning power of language models that can construct a cognitive map of a given environment. Our experiments demonstrate that cognitive map significantly enhances the performance of both optimal and reachable planning generation ability in the Gridworld path planning task. We observe that our method showcases two key characteristics similar to human cognition: generalization of its planning ability to extrapolated environments and rapid adaptation with limited training data. We hope our findings in the Gridworld task provide insights into modeling human cognitive processes in language models, potentially leading to the development of more advanced and robust systems that better resemble human cognition.

Fine-tuning LLMs to inject new knowledge faces a critical challenge: LLMs can quickly memorize new facts, yet fail to use them for downstream reasoning tasks. We formalize this failure as the \textbf{Knowing--Using Gap}, characterized by an accuracy gap and a temporal lag between memorization and generalization. To understand this phenomenon, we fine-tune LLMs with unseen knowledge and monitor the spatial permeation dynamics of the knowledge internally using a novel intervention technique called self-patching. Self-patching identifies activation locations where relocating representations substantially improves failed generalization cases. These results are consistent with a knowledge-circuit misalignment hypothesis: memorized representations can exist internally but may not be routed to computation-effective layers. To demonstrate the practicality of this diagnostic finding, we design a simple heuristic strategy which recovers 58--75\% of the oracle headroom in generalization failure. Experiments are done cross-domain for the robustness of this finding.

Measuring the full abilities of large language models (LLMs) requires benchmarks representing multiple tasks. We aim to create large, high-quality datasets for comparison of logical reasoning skills across several languages and of suitable difficulty for LLMs of various reasoning ability. We explore multiple ways of increasing difficulty. We generate zebra puzzles in multiple languages, themes, sizes and including 14 different clue types and 8 red herring types (uninformative clues). We find puzzle sizes 2x3 and 4x5 are sufficiently challenging for GPT-4o mini (a non-reasoning model) and o3-mini (a reasoning model), respectively. Including 5 red herrings decreases o3-mini puzzle-level accuracy on 4x5 puzzles by 15pm7 %. Scores of o3-mini on 4x5 puzzles are not significantly affected by use of English vs. Danish or the common houses theme vs. the country-specific smoerrebroed theme. We find no correlation between difficulty and the selected clue types. Datasets of 128+1024 puzzles are published as MultiZebraLogic in each of nine Germanic languages for sizes 2x3 and 4x5. We publish code for puzzle generation, designed for adaptablity into more languages and themes.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

Recent methods for embodied instruction following are typically trained end-to-end using imitation learning. This often requires the use of expert trajectories and low-level language instructions. Such approaches assume that neural states will integrate multimodal semantics to perform state tracking, building spatial memory, exploration, and long-term planning. In contrast, we propose a modular method with structured representations that (1) builds a semantic map of the scene and (2) performs exploration with a semantic search policy, to achieve the natural language goal. Our modular method achieves SOTA performance (24.46 %) with a substantial (8.17 % absolute) gap from previous work while using less data by eschewing both expert trajectories and low-level instructions. Leveraging low-level language, however, can further increase our performance (26.49 %). Our findings suggest that an explicit spatial memory and a semantic search policy can provide a stronger and more general representation for state-tracking and guidance, even in the absence of expert trajectories or low-level instructions.

In this report, we describe the vision, challenges, and scientific contributions of the Task Wizard team, TWIZ, in the Alexa Prize TaskBot Challenge 2022. Our vision, is to build TWIZ bot as an helpful, multimodal, knowledgeable, and engaging assistant that can guide users towards the successful completion of complex manual tasks. To achieve this, we focus our efforts on three main research questions: (1) Humanly-Shaped Conversations, by providing information in a knowledgeable way; (2) Multimodal Stimulus, making use of various modalities including voice, images, and videos; and (3) Zero-shot Conversational Flows, to improve the robustness of the interaction to unseen scenarios. TWIZ is an assistant capable of supporting a wide range of tasks, with several innovative features such as creative cooking, video navigation through voice, and the robust TWIZ-LLM, a Large Language Model trained for dialoguing about complex manual tasks. Given ratings and feedback provided by users, we observed that TWIZ bot is an effective and robust system, capable of guiding users through tasks while providing several multimodal stimuli.

A defining feature of human intelligence is the ability to adapt to changing environments by inferring latent task structure from sparse observations. Neuroscientific research indicates that this capability relies on the hippocampus constructing abstract representations, expressed as low-dimensional, approximately orthogonal manifolds in neural state space. However, the internal mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) remain largely opaque, making it unclear whether they form comparable abstract representations or instead rely on task-specific statistical regularities when performing comparable reasoning tasks. Here we adapt a contextual reversal-learning paradigm to a text-based setting and compare humans and LLMs at both the Behavioural and representational levels. We report that although LLMs exhibit generalizable reasoning less frequently than humans, when such inference occurs, their internal states exhibit abstract geometric structures that resemble those reported in the hippocampus. Notably, this representational geometry is not uniformly distributed but is organized hierarchically across model depth: whereas lower layers show early, stable encoding of stimulus identity, higher layers form a hippocampal-like functional band enriched for abstract context geometry associated with inference. Furthermore, complementary intervention experiments mechanistically implicate geometry in reasoning: task-sequence language modelling induces geometric disentanglement, whereas geometric regularization of higher layers increases the emergence of generalizable inference. Together, these findings establish abstract representational geometry as a mechanistic principle supporting inference in large language models.

In-context learning enables large language models (LLMs) to perform a variety of tasks, including learning to make reward-maximizing choices in simple bandit tasks. Given their potential use as (autonomous) decision-making agents, it is important to understand how these models perform such reinforcement learning (RL) tasks and the extent to which they are susceptible to biases. Motivated by the fact that, in humans, it has been widely documented that the value of an outcome depends on how it compares to other local outcomes, the present study focuses on whether similar value encoding biases apply to how LLMs encode rewarding outcomes. Results from experiments with multiple bandit tasks and models show that LLMs exhibit behavioral signatures of a relative value bias. Adding explicit outcome comparisons to the prompt produces opposing effects on performance, enhancing maximization in trained choice sets but impairing generalization to new choice sets. Computational cognitive modeling reveals that LLM behavior is well-described by a simple RL algorithm that incorporates relative values at the outcome encoding stage. Lastly, we present preliminary evidence that the observed biases are not limited to fine-tuned LLMs, and that relative value processing is detectable in the final hidden layer activations of a raw, pretrained model. These findings have important implications for the use of LLMs in decision-making applications.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

Existing Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown the potential of reinforcement learning (RL) to enhance the complex reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models~(LLMs). While they achieve remarkable performance on challenging tasks such as mathematics and coding, they often rely on their internal knowledge to solve problems, which can be inadequate for time-sensitive or knowledge-intensive questions, leading to inaccuracies and hallucinations. To address this, we propose R1-Searcher, a novel two-stage outcome-based RL approach designed to enhance the search capabilities of LLMs. This method allows LLMs to autonomously invoke external search systems to access additional knowledge during the reasoning process. Our framework relies exclusively on RL, without requiring process rewards or distillation for a cold start. % effectively generalizing to out-of-domain datasets and supporting both Base and Instruct models. Our experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms previous strong RAG methods, even when compared to the closed-source GPT-4o-mini.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in automating scientific hypothesis generation, yet existing approaches primarily yield coarse-grained hypotheses lacking critical methodological and experimental details. We introduce and formally define the novel task of fine-grained scientific hypothesis discovery, which entails generating detailed, experimentally actionable hypotheses from coarse initial research directions. We frame this as a combinatorial optimization problem and investigate the upper limits of LLMs' capacity to solve it when maximally leveraged. Specifically, we explore four foundational questions: (1) how to best harness an LLM's internal heuristics to formulate the fine-grained hypothesis it itself would judge as the most promising among all the possible hypotheses it might generate, based on its own internal scoring-thus defining a latent reward landscape over the hypothesis space; (2) whether such LLM-judged better hypotheses exhibit stronger alignment with ground-truth hypotheses; (3) whether shaping the reward landscape using an ensemble of diverse LLMs of similar capacity yields better outcomes than defining it with repeated instances of the strongest LLM among them; and (4) whether an ensemble of identical LLMs provides a more reliable reward landscape than a single LLM. To address these questions, we propose a hierarchical search method that incrementally proposes and integrates details into the hypothesis, progressing from general concepts to specific experimental configurations. We show that this hierarchical process smooths the reward landscape and enables more effective optimization. Empirical evaluations on a new benchmark of expert-annotated fine-grained hypotheses from recent chemistry literature show that our method consistently outperforms strong baselines.

We study how different Chain-of-Thought (CoT) designs affect the acquisition of the generalizable visual reasoning ability in vision-language models (VLMs). While CoT data, especially long or visual CoT such as "think with image", has been widely used to supervise intermediate reasoning, it remains unclear why specific CoT designs help and which ones truly support generalizable reasoning. To systematically evaluate this, we focus on a controlled maze-solving benchmark where reasoning rules are fully visual, difficulty can be tuned by grid size, and all the intermediate steps can be automatically generated. Using Qwen2.5-VL-7B under a standard SFT-then-RL pipeline, we compare three representative CoT formats: Language CoT, Grounding CoT (with spatial coordinate trajectories), and Visual CoT (with image manipulations). Our experiments reveal that visual and longer CoT mainly accelerate convergence but do not lift the final performance ceiling; concise CoT containing only essential grounding steps outperforms longer traces; and, strikingly, CoT retaining only the minimal grounding results generalizes best across different maze sizes. We further validate these insights on other vision-centric tasks. These findings highlight a "short is long" effect and provide practical guidance for constructing more generalizable SFT datasets for visual reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Previous work has shown correlations between the hidden states of large language models and fMRI brain responses, on language tasks. These correlations have been taken as evidence of the representational similarity of these models and brain states. This study tests whether these previous results are robust to several possible concerns. Specifically this study shows: (i) that the previous results are still found after dimensionality reduction, and thus are not attributable to the curse of dimensionality; (ii) that previous results are confirmed when using new measures of similarity; (iii) that correlations between brain representations and those from models are specific to models trained on human language; and (iv) that the results are dependent on the presence of positional encoding in the models. These results confirm and strengthen the results of previous research and contribute to the debate on the biological plausibility and interpretability of state-of-the-art large language models.

Pre-trained language models can be surprisingly adept at tasks they were not explicitly trained on, but how they implement these capabilities is poorly understood. In this paper, we investigate the basic mathematical abilities often acquired by pre-trained language models. Concretely, we use mechanistic interpretability techniques to explain the (limited) mathematical abilities of GPT-2 small. As a case study, we examine its ability to take in sentences such as "The war lasted from the year 1732 to the year 17", and predict valid two-digit end years (years > 32). We first identify a circuit, a small subset of GPT-2 small's computational graph that computes this task's output. Then, we explain the role of each circuit component, showing that GPT-2 small's final multi-layer perceptrons boost the probability of end years greater than the start year. Finally, we find related tasks that activate our circuit. Our results suggest that GPT-2 small computes greater-than using a complex but general mechanism that activates across diverse contexts.

Learning from human feedback has gained traction in fields like robotics and natural language processing in recent years. While prior works mostly rely on human feedback in the form of comparisons, language is a preferable modality that provides more informative insights into user preferences. In this work, we aim to incorporate comparative language feedback to iteratively improve robot trajectories and to learn reward functions that encode human preferences. To achieve this goal, we learn a shared latent space that integrates trajectory data and language feedback, and subsequently leverage the learned latent space to improve trajectories and learn human preferences. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to incorporate comparative language feedback into reward learning. Our simulation experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the learned latent space and the success of our learning algorithms. We also conduct human subject studies that show our reward learning algorithm achieves a 23.9% higher subjective score on average and is 11.3% more time-efficient compared to preference-based reward learning, underscoring the superior performance of our method. Our website is at https://liralab.usc.edu/comparative-language-feedback/

We present TACIT (Transformation-Aware Capturing of Implicit Thought), a diffusion-based transformer for interpretable visual reasoning. Unlike language-based reasoning systems, TACIT operates entirely in pixel space using rectified flow, enabling direct visualization of the reasoning process at each inference step. We demonstrate the approach on maze-solving, where the model learns to transform images of unsolved mazes into solutions. Key results on 1 million synthetic maze pairs include: - 192x reduction in training loss over 100 epochs - 22.7x improvement in L2 distance to ground truth - Only 10 Euler steps required (vs. 100-1000 for typical diffusion models) Quantitative analysis reveals a striking phase transition phenomenon: the solution remains invisible for 68% of the transformation (zero recall), then emerges abruptly at t=0.70 within just 2% of the process. Most remarkably, 100% of samples exhibit simultaneous emergence across all spatial regions, ruling out sequential path construction and providing evidence for holistic rather than algorithmic reasoning. This "eureka moment" pattern -- long incubation followed by sudden crystallization -- parallels insight phenomena in human cognition. The pixel-space design with noise-free flow matching provides a foundation for understanding how neural networks develop implicit reasoning strategies that operate below and before language.

Typically, children start to learn their first words between 6 and 9 months, linking spoken utterances to their visual referents. Without prior knowledge, a word encountered for the first time can be interpreted in countless ways; it might refer to any of the objects in the environment, their components, or attributes. Using longitudinal, egocentric, and ecologically valid data from the experience of one child, in this work, we propose a self-supervised and biologically plausible strategy to learn strong visual representations. Our masked autoencoder-based visual backbone incorporates knowledge about the blind spot in human eyes to define a novel masking strategy. This mask and reconstruct approach attempts to mimic the way the human brain fills the gaps in the eyes' field of view. This represents a significant shift from standard random masking strategies, which are difficult to justify from a biological perspective. The pretrained encoder is utilized in a contrastive learning-based video-text model capable of acquiring word-referent mappings. Extensive evaluation suggests that the proposed biologically plausible masking strategy is at least as effective as random masking for learning word-referent mappings from cross-situational and temporally extended episodes.

Attention mechanisms are a central property of cognitive systems allowing them to selectively deploy cognitive resources in a flexible manner. Attention has been long studied in the neurosciences and there are numerous phenomenological models that try to capture its core properties. Recently attentional mechanisms have become a dominating architectural choice of machine learning and are the central innovation of Transformers. The dominant intuition and formalism underlying their development has drawn on ideas of keys and queries in database management systems. In this work, we propose an alternative Bayesian foundation for attentional mechanisms and show how this unifies different attentional architectures in machine learning. This formulation allows to to identify commonality across different attention ML architectures as well as suggest a bridge to those developed in neuroscience. We hope this work will guide more sophisticated intuitions into the key properties of attention architectures and suggest new ones.

Memory serves as the pivotal nexus bridging past and future, providing both humans and AI systems with invaluable concepts and experience to navigate complex tasks. Recent research on autonomous agents has increasingly focused on designing efficient memory workflows by drawing on cognitive neuroscience. However, constrained by interdisciplinary barriers, existing works struggle to assimilate the essence of human memory mechanisms. To bridge this gap, we systematically synthesizes interdisciplinary knowledge of memory, connecting insights from cognitive neuroscience with LLM-driven agents. Specifically, we first elucidate the definition and function of memory along a progressive trajectory from cognitive neuroscience through LLMs to agents. We then provide a comparative analysis of memory taxonomy, storage mechanisms, and the complete management lifecycle from both biological and artificial perspectives. Subsequently, we review the mainstream benchmarks for evaluating agent memory. Additionally, we explore memory security from dual perspectives of attack and defense. Finally, we envision future research directions, with a focus on multimodal memory systems and skill acquisition.

Causal language modeling using the Transformer architecture has yielded remarkable capabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) over the last few years. However, the extent to which fundamental search and reasoning capabilities emerged within LLMs remains a topic of ongoing debate. In this work, we study if causal language modeling can learn a complex task such as solving Sudoku puzzles. To solve a Sudoku, the model is first required to search over all empty cells of the puzzle to decide on a cell to fill and then apply an appropriate strategy to fill the decided cell. Sometimes, the application of a strategy only results in thinning down the possible values in a cell rather than concluding the exact value of the cell. In such cases, multiple strategies are applied one after the other to fill a single cell. We observe that Transformer models trained on this synthetic task can indeed learn to solve Sudokus (our model solves 94.21% of the puzzles fully correctly) when trained on a logical sequence of steps taken by a solver. We find that training Transformers with the logical sequence of steps is necessary and without such training, they fail to learn Sudoku. We also extend our analysis to Zebra puzzles (known as Einstein puzzles) and show that the model solves 92.04 % of the puzzles fully correctly. In addition, we study the internal representations of the trained Transformer and find that through linear probing, we can decode information about the set of possible values in any given cell from them, pointing to the presence of a strong reasoning engine implicit in the Transformer weights.

Despite their stellar performance on a wide range of tasks, including in-context tasks only revealed during inference, vanilla transformers and variants trained for next-token predictions (a) do not learn an explicit world model of their environment which can be flexibly queried and (b) cannot be used for planning or navigation. In this paper, we consider partially observed environments (POEs), where an agent receives perceptually aliased observations as it navigates, which makes path planning hard. We introduce a transformer with (multiple) discrete bottleneck(s), TDB, whose latent codes learn a compressed representation of the history of observations and actions. After training a TDB to predict the future observation(s) given the history, we extract interpretable cognitive maps of the environment from its active bottleneck(s) indices. These maps are then paired with an external solver to solve (constrained) path planning problems. First, we show that a TDB trained on POEs (a) retains the near perfect predictive performance of a vanilla transformer or an LSTM while (b) solving shortest path problems exponentially faster. Second, a TDB extracts interpretable representations from text datasets, while reaching higher in-context accuracy than vanilla sequence models. Finally, in new POEs, a TDB (a) reaches near-perfect in-context accuracy, (b) learns accurate in-context cognitive maps (c) solves in-context path planning problems.

Reinforcement learning (RL) promises to expand the capabilities of language models, but it is unclear if current RL techniques promote the discovery of novel behaviors, or simply sharpen those already present in the base model. In this paper, we investigate the value of deliberate exploration -- explicitly incentivizing the model to discover novel and diverse behaviors -- and aim to understand how the knowledge in pre-trained models can guide this search. Our main finding is that exploration with a simple, principled, representation-based bonus derived from the pre-trained language model's hidden states significantly improves diversity and pass@k rates -- both for post-training, and in a novel inference-time scaling setting we introduce. For inference-time, exploration with representation-based diversity improves efficiency, consistently improving pass@k rates across a variety of models and reasoning tasks. For example, for Qwen-2.5-14b-Instruct we obtain over 50% improvement in verifier efficiency on almost all tasks. For post-training, we show that integrating this exploration strategy into an RL pipeline improves reasoning performance over that of the initial model and over standard RL post-training. For example, on AIME 2024, our post-trained Qwen-2.5-7b-Instruct's pass@80 matches the pass@256 of GRPO on the same model, demonstrating a 3x improvement in test-time sample efficiency. Overall, our findings suggest that deliberate exploration -- with the right notion of diversity -- is a practical path toward discovery of new behaviors beyond sharpening.

Visual search is a ubiquitous and often challenging daily task, exemplified by looking for the car keys at home or a friend in a crowd. An intriguing property of some classical search tasks is an asymmetry such that finding a target A among distractors B can be easier than finding B among A. To elucidate the mechanisms responsible for asymmetry in visual search, we propose a computational model that takes a target and a search image as inputs and produces a sequence of eye movements until the target is found. The model integrates eccentricity-dependent visual recognition with target-dependent top-down cues. We compared the model against human behavior in six paradigmatic search tasks that show asymmetry in humans. Without prior exposure to the stimuli or task-specific training, the model provides a plausible mechanism for search asymmetry. We hypothesized that the polarity of search asymmetry arises from experience with the natural environment. We tested this hypothesis by training the model on augmented versions of ImageNet where the biases of natural images were either removed or reversed. The polarity of search asymmetry disappeared or was altered depending on the training protocol. This study highlights how classical perceptual properties can emerge in neural network models, without the need for task-specific training, but rather as a consequence of the statistical properties of the developmental diet fed to the model. All source code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/kreimanlab/VisualSearchAsymmetry.

Language-guided human following is an important capability for embodied agents, but existing benchmarks typically assume that the target person is visible at the start of an episode. This setting simplifies the problem and overlooks a more realistic requirement: an agent often needs to first find a language-described target and then persistently follow that target in a dynamic environment. While recent work has started to study human search, existing settings are typically evaluated in task-specific scenarios and often rely on stronger prior knowledge of the environment. Moreover, they usually treat searching and following as separate tasks and still lack a unified benchmark for systematic evaluation. To address these limitations, we introduce the Unified Embodied Seeking and Following Benchmark (UESF-Bench), a large-scale and diverse benchmark for embodied human seeking and following. The benchmark requires agents to handle semantic-guided exploration, reliable behavior switching and recovery, and delayed identity grounding. To this end, we propose SeekFollow-VLA, a vision-language-action framework with a task-driven routing mechanism for latent phase inference and transition modeling between seeking and following. Experimental results show that SeekFollow-VLA achieves clear improvements over both single-head and dual-head baselines across single-person and multi-person environments, establishing a baseline for unified embodied seek-and-follow.

Scaling up language models to billions of parameters has opened up possibilities for in-context learning, allowing instruction tuning and few-shot learning on tasks that the model was not specifically trained for. This has achieved breakthrough performance on language tasks such as translation, summarization, and question-answering. Furthermore, in addition to these associative "System 1" tasks, recent advances in Chain-of-thought prompt learning have demonstrated strong "System 2" reasoning abilities, answering a question in the field of artificial general intelligence whether LLMs can reason. The field started with the question whether LLMs can solve grade school math word problems. This paper reviews the rapidly expanding field of prompt-based reasoning with LLMs. Our taxonomy identifies different ways to generate, evaluate, and control multi-step reasoning. We provide an in-depth coverage of core approaches and open problems, and we propose a research agenda for the near future. Finally, we highlight the relation between reasoning and prompt-based learning, and we discuss the relation between reasoning, sequential decision processes, and reinforcement learning. We find that self-improvement, self-reflection, and some metacognitive abilities of the reasoning processes are possible through the judicious use of prompts. True self-improvement and self-reasoning, to go from reasoning with LLMs to reasoning by LLMs, remains future work.

This paper surveys research in the rapidly growing field of enhancing large language models (LLMs) with reinforcement learning (RL), a technique that enables LLMs to improve their performance by receiving feedback in the form of rewards based on the quality of their outputs, allowing them to generate more accurate, coherent, and contextually appropriate responses. In this work, we make a systematic review of the most up-to-date state of knowledge on RL-enhanced LLMs, attempting to consolidate and analyze the rapidly growing research in this field, helping researchers understand the current challenges and advancements. Specifically, we (1) detail the basics of RL; (2) introduce popular RL-enhanced LLMs; (3) review researches on two widely-used reward model-based RL techniques: Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and Reinforcement Learning from AI Feedback (RLAIF); and (4) explore Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), a set of methods that bypass the reward model to directly use human preference data for aligning LLM outputs with human expectations. We will also point out current challenges and deficiencies of existing methods and suggest some avenues for further improvements. Project page of this work can be found at: https://github.com/ShuheWang1998/Reinforcement-Learning-Enhanced-LLMs-A-Survey.

Current AI systems achieve impressive performance on many tasks, yet they lack core attributes of biological intelligence, including rapid, continual learning, representations grounded in sensorimotor interactions, and structured knowledge that enables efficient generalization. Neuroscience theory suggests that mammals evolved flexible intelligence through the replication of a semi-independent, sensorimotor module, a functional unit known as a cortical column. To address the disparity between biological and artificial intelligence, thousand-brains systems were proposed as a means of mirroring the architecture of cortical columns and their interactions. In the current work, we evaluate the unique properties of Monty, the first implementation of a thousand-brains system. We focus on 3D object perception, and in particular, the combined task of object recognition and pose estimation. Utilizing the YCB dataset of household objects, we first assess Monty's use of sensorimotor learning to build structured representations, finding that these enable robust generalization. These representations include an emphasis on classifying objects by their global shape, as well as a natural ability to detect object symmetries. We then explore Monty's use of model-free and model-based policies to enable rapid inference by supporting principled movements. We find that such policies complement Monty's modular architecture, a design that can accommodate communication between modules to further accelerate inference speed via a novel `voting' algorithm. Finally, we examine Monty's use of associative, Hebbian-like binding to enable rapid, continual, and computationally efficient learning, properties that compare favorably to current deep learning architectures. While Monty is still in a nascent stage of development, these findings support thousand-brains systems as a powerful and promising new approach to AI.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated that reinforcement fine-tuning of pretrained base models can lead to significant gains in reasoning performance at inference time. In this work, we theoretically analyze why reinforcement fine-tuning induces better reasoning ability than purely supervised fine-tuning (SFT) methods. We model chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning as a pathfinding problem on graphs and compare the popular method of reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) against traditional SFT. We prove that SFT, when trained on golden shortest paths without negative examples, fails to learn how to efficiently backtrack. In contrast, an RLVR-trained model can learn how to efficiently backtrack from dead ends using only outcome reward. This leads to an exponential separation in inference-time compute between the two methods, and demonstrates that RLVR leads the model to learn the location of difficult decisions in a reasoning chain, ultimately allowing for better allocation of inference-time compute. Finally, we show that the reasoning traces of an RLVR model can be distilled to train a base model to backtrack efficiently as well.

Most existing spatial reasoning benchmarks focus on static or globally observable environments, failing to capture the challenges of long-horizon reasoning and memory utilization under partial observability and dynamic changes. We introduce two dynamic spatial benchmarks, locally observable maze navigation and match-2 elimination that systematically evaluate models' abilities in spatial understanding and adaptive planning when local perception, environment feedback, and global objectives are tightly coupled. Each action triggers structural changes in the environment, requiring continuous update of cognition and strategy. We further propose a subjective experience-based memory mechanism for cross-task experience transfer and validation. Experiments show that our benchmarks reveal key limitations of mainstream models in dynamic spatial reasoning and long-term memory, providing a comprehensive platform for future methodological advances. Our code and data are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/EvoEmpirBench-143C/.

Large language models (LMs) are able to in-context learn -- perform a new task via inference alone by conditioning on a few input-label pairs (demonstrations) and making predictions for new inputs. However, there has been little understanding of how the model learns and which aspects of the demonstrations contribute to end task performance. In this paper, we show that ground truth demonstrations are in fact not required -- randomly replacing labels in the demonstrations barely hurts performance on a range of classification and multi-choce tasks, consistently over 12 different models including GPT-3. Instead, we find that other aspects of the demonstrations are the key drivers of end task performance, including the fact that they provide a few examples of (1) the label space, (2) the distribution of the input text, and (3) the overall format of the sequence. Together, our analysis provides a new way of understanding how and why in-context learning works, while opening up new questions about how much can be learned from large language models through inference alone.

The ability to predict upcoming events has been hypothesized to comprise a key aspect of natural and machine cognition. This is supported by trends in deep reinforcement learning (RL), where self-supervised auxiliary objectives such as prediction are widely used to support representation learning and improve task performance. Here, we study the effects predictive auxiliary objectives have on representation learning across different modules of an RL system and how these mimic representational changes observed in the brain. We find that predictive objectives improve and stabilize learning particularly in resource-limited architectures, and we identify settings where longer predictive horizons better support representational transfer. Furthermore, we find that representational changes in this RL system bear a striking resemblance to changes in neural activity observed in the brain across various experiments. Specifically, we draw a connection between the auxiliary predictive model of the RL system and hippocampus, an area thought to learn a predictive model to support memory-guided behavior. We also connect the encoder network and the value learning network of the RL system to visual cortex and striatum in the brain, respectively. This work demonstrates how representation learning in deep RL systems can provide an interpretable framework for modeling multi-region interactions in the brain. The deep RL perspective taken here also suggests an additional role of the hippocampus in the brain -- that of an auxiliary learning system that benefits representation learning in other regions.

Visual-Interleaved Chain-of-Thought (VI-CoT) enables MLLMs to continually update their understanding and decisions based on step-wise intermediate visual states (IVS), much like a human would, which demonstrates impressive success in various tasks, thereby leading to emerged advancements in related benchmarks. Despite promising progress, current benchmarks provide models with relatively fixed IVS, rather than free-style IVS, whch might forcibly distort the original thinking trajectories, failing to evaluate their intrinsic reasoning capabilities. More importantly, existing benchmarks neglect to systematically explore the impact factors that IVS would impart to untamed reasoning performance. To tackle above gaps, we introduce a specialized benchmark termed ViC-Bench, consisting of four representive tasks: maze navigation, jigsaw puzzle, embodied long-horizon planning, and complex counting, where each task has dedicated free-style IVS generation pipeline supporting function calls. To systematically examine VI-CoT capability, we propose a thorough evaluation suite incorporating a progressive three-stage strategy with targeted new metrics. Besides, we establish Incremental Prompting Information Injection (IPII) strategy to ablatively explore the prompting factors for VI-CoT. We extensively conduct evaluations for 18 advanced MLLMs, revealing key insights into their VI-CoT capability. Our proposed benchmark is publicly open at Huggingface.

While the ability of language models to elicit facts has been widely investigated, how they handle temporally changing facts remains underexplored. We discover Temporal Heads, specific attention heads primarily responsible for processing temporal knowledge through circuit analysis. We confirm that these heads are present across multiple models, though their specific locations may vary, and their responses differ depending on the type of knowledge and its corresponding years. Disabling these heads degrades the model's ability to recall time-specific knowledge while maintaining its general capabilities without compromising time-invariant and question-answering performances. Moreover, the heads are activated not only numeric conditions ("In 2004") but also textual aliases ("In the year ..."), indicating that they encode a temporal dimension beyond simple numerical representation. Furthermore, we expand the potential of our findings by demonstrating how temporal knowledge can be edited by adjusting the values of these heads.

A long-standing finding in the causal learning literature is that adults struggle to identify conjunctive causal rules, where an effect requires the simultaneous presence of multiple causes, while performing better in disjunctive settings. However, most demonstrations of this ``conjunctive handicap'' rely on passive observation paradigms with limited evidence, where learners have no control over evidence generation. This paper asks whether this bias persists when adults are granted agency through active exploration. Using a modified ``blicket detector'' task, adult participants freely intervened to identify causal objects under conjunctive or disjunctive rule structures. We show that active exploration substantially improves adults' conjunctive causal reasoning, although conjunctive rules still require more tests to infer than disjunctive rules. We further compare human performance to a range of large language models in the same setting. While some state-of-the-art models approach human-level performance on hypothesis inference accuracy, they often exhibit less efficient exploration strategies and similar conjunctive-disjunctive performance gaps.

We present a methodology that explores how sentence structure is reflected in neural representations of machine translation systems. We demonstrate our model-agnostic approach with the Transformer English-German translation model. We analyze neuron-level correlation of activations between paraphrases while discussing the methodology challenges and the need for confound analysis to isolate the effects of shallow cues. We find that similarity between activation patterns can be mostly accounted for by similarity in word choice and sentence length. Following that, we manipulate neuron activations to control the syntactic form of the output. We show this intervention to be somewhat successful, indicating that deep models capture sentence-structure distinctions, despite finding no such indication at the neuron level. To conduct our experiments, we develop a semi-automatic method to generate meaning-preserving minimal pair paraphrases (active-passive voice and adverbial clause-noun phrase) and compile a corpus of such pairs.

We investigate the extent to which contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs) can engage in exploration, a core capability in reinforcement learning and decision making. We focus on native performance of existing LLMs, without training interventions. We deploy LLMs as agents in simple multi-armed bandit environments, specifying the environment description and interaction history entirely in-context, i.e., within the LLM prompt. We experiment with GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Llama2, using a variety of prompt designs, and find that the models do not robustly engage in exploration without substantial interventions: i) Across all of our experiments, only one configuration resulted in satisfactory exploratory behavior: GPT-4 with chain-of-thought reasoning and an externally summarized interaction history, presented as sufficient statistics; ii) All other configurations did not result in robust exploratory behavior, including those with chain-of-thought reasoning but unsummarized history. Although these findings can be interpreted positively, they suggest that external summarization -- which may not be possible in more complex settings -- is important for obtaining desirable behavior from LLM agents. We conclude that non-trivial algorithmic interventions, such as fine-tuning or dataset curation, may be required to empower LLM-based decision making agents in complex settings.

We introduce KiloGram, a resource for studying abstract visual reasoning in humans and machines. Drawing on the history of tangram puzzles as stimuli in cognitive science, we build a richly annotated dataset that, with >1k distinct stimuli, is orders of magnitude larger and more diverse than prior resources. It is both visually and linguistically richer, moving beyond whole shape descriptions to include segmentation maps and part labels. We use this resource to evaluate the abstract visual reasoning capacities of recent multi-modal models. We observe that pre-trained weights demonstrate limited abstract reasoning, which dramatically improves with fine-tuning. We also observe that explicitly describing parts aids abstract reasoning for both humans and models, especially when jointly encoding the linguistic and visual inputs. KiloGram is available at https://lil.nlp.cornell.edu/kilogram .

Large multimodal models extend the impressive capabilities of large language models by integrating multimodal understanding abilities. However, it is not clear how they can emulate the general intelligence and reasoning ability of humans. As recognizing patterns and abstracting concepts are key to general intelligence, we introduce PuzzleVQA, a collection of puzzles based on abstract patterns. With this dataset, we evaluate large multimodal models with abstract patterns based on fundamental concepts, including colors, numbers, sizes, and shapes. Through our experiments on state-of-the-art large multimodal models, we find that they are not able to generalize well to simple abstract patterns. Notably, even GPT-4V cannot solve more than half of the puzzles. To diagnose the reasoning challenges in large multimodal models, we progressively guide the models with our ground truth reasoning explanations for visual perception, inductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning. Our systematic analysis finds that the main bottlenecks of GPT-4V are weaker visual perception and inductive reasoning abilities. Through this work, we hope to shed light on the limitations of large multimodal models and how they can better emulate human cognitive processes in the future (Our data and code will be released publicly at https://github.com/declare-lab/LLM-PuzzleTest).

The exploration of whether agents can align with their environment without relying on human-labeled data presents an intriguing research topic. Drawing inspiration from the alignment process observed in intelligent organisms, where declarative memory plays a pivotal role in summarizing past experiences, we propose a novel learning framework. The agents adeptly distill insights from past experiences, refining and updating existing notes to enhance their performance in the environment. This entire process transpires within the memory components and is implemented through natural language, so we character this framework as In-memory Learning. We also delve into the key features of benchmarks designed to evaluate the self-improvement process. Through systematic experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework and provide insights into this problem.

When reading, we often have specific information that interests us in a text. For example, you might be reading this paper because you are curious about LLMs for eye movements in reading, the experimental design, or perhaps you only care about the question ``but does it work?''. More broadly, in daily life, people approach texts with any number of text-specific goals that guide their reading behavior. In this work, we ask, for the first time, whether open-ended reading goals can be automatically decoded from eye movements in reading. To address this question, we introduce goal classification and goal reconstruction tasks and evaluation frameworks, and use large-scale eye tracking for reading data in English with hundreds of text-specific information seeking tasks. We develop and compare several discriminative and generative multimodal LLMs that combine eye movements and text for goal classification and goal reconstruction. Our experiments show considerable success on both tasks, suggesting that LLMs can extract valuable information about the readers' text-specific goals from eye movements.

Video diffusion models exhibit emergent reasoning capabilities like solving mazes and puzzles, yet little is understood about how they reason during generation. We take a first step towards understanding this and study the internal planning dynamics of video models using 2D maze solving as a controlled testbed. Our investigations reveal two findings. Our first finding is early plan commitment: video diffusion models commit to a high-level motion plan within the first few denoising steps, after which further denoising alters visual details but not the underlying trajectory. Our second finding is that path length, not obstacle density, is the dominant predictor of maze difficulty, with a sharp failure threshold at 12 steps. This means video models can only reason over long mazes by chaining together multiple sequential generations. To demonstrate the practical benefits of our findings, we introduce Chaining with Early Planning, or ChEaP, which only spends compute on seeds with promising early plans and chains them together to tackle complex mazes. This improves accuracy from 7% to 67% on long-horizon mazes and by 2.5x overall on hard tasks in Frozen Lake and VR-Bench across Wan2.2-14B and HunyuanVideo-1.5. Our analysis reveals that current video models possess deeper reasoning capabilities than previously recognized, which can be elicited more reliably with better inference-time scaling.

Human beings primarily understand the world through concepts (e.g., dog), abstract mental representations that structure perception, reasoning, and learning. However, how large language models (LLMs) acquire, retain, and forget such concepts during continual pretraining remains poorly understood. In this work, we study how individual concepts are acquired and forgotten, as well as how multiple concepts interact through interference and synergy. We link these behavioral dynamics to LLMs' internal concept circuits, computational subgraphs associated with specific concepts, and incorporate graph metrics to characterize circuit topology. Our analysis reveals: (1) LLMs concept circuits provide a non-trivial, consistent signal of concept learning and forgetting; (2) concept circuits exhibit a stage-wise temporal pattern during continual pretraining, with an early increase followed by gradual decrease and stabilization; (3) concepts with larger learning gains tend to exhibit greater forgetting under subsequent training; (4) semantically similar concepts induce stronger interference than weakly related ones; (5) conceptual knowledge differs in their transferability, with some significantly facilitating the learning of others. Together, our findings provide a circuit-level view of concept learning dynamics and motivate concept-aware training strategies, such as Circuit-aware Experience Replay, which uses circuit topology to prioritize concepts vulnerable to forgetting.

The last decade has seen a significant increase of interest in deep learning research, with many public successes that have demonstrated its potential. As such, these systems are now being incorporated into commercial products. With this comes an additional challenge: how can we build AI systems that solve tasks where there is not a crisp, well-defined specification? While multiple solutions have been proposed, in this competition we focus on one in particular: learning from human feedback. Rather than training AI systems using a predefined reward function or using a labeled dataset with a predefined set of categories, we instead train the AI system using a learning signal derived from some form of human feedback, which can evolve over time as the understanding of the task changes, or as the capabilities of the AI system improve. The MineRL BASALT competition aims to spur forward research on this important class of techniques. We design a suite of four tasks in Minecraft for which we expect it will be hard to write down hardcoded reward functions. These tasks are defined by a paragraph of natural language: for example, "create a waterfall and take a scenic picture of it", with additional clarifying details. Participants must train a separate agent for each task, using any method they want. Agents are then evaluated by humans who have read the task description. To help participants get started, we provide a dataset of human demonstrations on each of the four tasks, as well as an imitation learning baseline that leverages these demonstrations. Our hope is that this competition will improve our ability to build AI systems that do what their designers intend them to do, even when the intent cannot be easily formalized. Besides allowing AI to solve more tasks, this can also enable more effective regulation of AI systems, as well as making progress on the value alignment problem.

In this paper, we present empirical evidence of skills and directed exploration emerging from a simple RL algorithm long before any successful trials are observed. For example, in a manipulation task, the agent is given a single observation of the goal state and learns skills, first for moving its end-effector, then for pushing the block, and finally for picking up and placing the block. These skills emerge before the agent has ever successfully placed the block at the goal location and without the aid of any reward functions, demonstrations, or manually-specified distance metrics. Once the agent has learned to reach the goal state reliably, exploration is reduced. Implementing our method involves a simple modification of prior work and does not require density estimates, ensembles, or any additional hyperparameters. Intuitively, the proposed method seems like it should be terrible at exploration, and we lack a clear theoretical understanding of why it works so effectively, though our experiments provide some hints.

Large language models often produce hallucinated answers that violate prompt-level constraints. A key diagnostic question is whether these failures reflect missing knowledge, or whether the model has the relevant information but follows the wrong inference path. We study this phenomenon as inference misalignment: a mismatch between the answer supported by the prompt and the answer favored by statistically salient latent associations. We formalize this view with a latent key-task model, in which pretraining-frequency imbalance can cause a shortcut path to dominate the constraint-sensitive path and induce positive inference loss. The framework predicts two failure modes: task-retrieval bias in entity disambiguation and key-selection bias in action choice. We introduce TrapQA, a controlled diagnostic testbed with two components. ScientistQA tests disambiguation among similar scientists with supplementary factual probes, while Real-Life Constrained QA tests everyday constraint following under salient shortcuts. Our results show that hallucination can arise from biased latent inference rather than absent knowledge alone.

When robots learn reward functions using high capacity models that take raw state directly as input, they need to both learn a representation for what matters in the task -- the task ``features" -- as well as how to combine these features into a single objective. If they try to do both at once from input designed to teach the full reward function, it is easy to end up with a representation that contains spurious correlations in the data, which fails to generalize to new settings. Instead, our ultimate goal is to enable robots to identify and isolate the causal features that people actually care about and use when they represent states and behavior. Our idea is that we can tune into this representation by asking users what behaviors they consider similar: behaviors will be similar if the features that matter are similar, even if low-level behavior is different; conversely, behaviors will be different if even one of the features that matter differs. This, in turn, is what enables the robot to disambiguate between what needs to go into the representation versus what is spurious, as well as what aspects of behavior can be compressed together versus not. The notion of learning representations based on similarity has a nice parallel in contrastive learning, a self-supervised representation learning technique that maps visually similar data points to similar embeddings, where similarity is defined by a designer through data augmentation heuristics. By contrast, in order to learn the representations that people use, so we can learn their preferences and objectives, we use their definition of similarity. In simulation as well as in a user study, we show that learning through such similarity queries leads to representations that, while far from perfect, are indeed more generalizable than self-supervised and task-input alternatives.

We investigate the potential of large language models (LLMs) to serve as efficient simulators for agentic search tasks in reinforcement learning (RL), thereby reducing dependence on costly interactions with external search engines. To this end, we first quantify the intrinsic search capability of LLMs via structured prompting and repeated sampling, which we term Self-Search. Our results reveal that LLMs exhibit strong scaling behavior with respect to the inference budget, achieving high pass@k on question-answering benchmarks, including the challenging BrowseComp task. Building on these observations, we introduce Self-Search RL (SSRL), which enhances LLMs' Self-Search capability through format-based and rule-based rewards. SSRL enables models to iteratively refine their knowledge utilization internally, without requiring access to external tools. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that SSRL-trained policy models provide a cost-effective and stable environment for search-driven RL training, reducing reliance on external search engines and facilitating robust sim-to-real transfer. We draw the following conclusions: 1) LLMs possess world knowledge that can be effectively elicited to achieve high performance; 2) SSRL demonstrates the potential of leveraging internal knowledge to reduce hallucination; 3) SSRL-trained models integrate seamlessly with external search engines without additional effort. Our findings highlight the potential of LLMs to support more scalable RL agent training.

In this paper, we investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) actively recall or retrieve their internal repositories of factual knowledge when faced with reasoning tasks. Through an analysis of LLMs' internal factual recall at each reasoning step via Knowledge Neurons, we reveal that LLMs fail to harness the critical factual associations under certain circumstances. Instead, they tend to opt for alternative, shortcut-like pathways to answer reasoning questions. By manually manipulating the recall process of parametric knowledge in LLMs, we demonstrate that enhancing this recall process directly improves reasoning performance whereas suppressing it leads to notable degradation. Furthermore, we assess the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a powerful technique for addressing complex reasoning tasks. Our findings indicate that CoT can intensify the recall of factual knowledge by encouraging LLMs to engage in orderly and reliable reasoning. Furthermore, we explored how contextual conflicts affect the retrieval of facts during the reasoning process to gain a comprehensive understanding of the factual recall behaviors of LLMs. Code and data will be available soon.

Recent studies show that LLM hidden states encode reward-related information, such as answer correctness and model confidence. However, existing approaches typically fit black-box probes on the full hidden states, offering little insight into how this information is structured across neurons. In this paper, we show that reward-related information is concentrated in a sparse subset of neurons. Using simple probing, we identify two types of neurons: value neurons, whose activations predict state value, and dopamine neurons, whose activations encode step-level temporal difference (TD) errors. Together, these neurons form a sparse reward subsystem within LLM hidden states. These names are drawn by analogy with neuroscience, where value neurons and dopamine neurons in the biological reward subsystem also encode value and reward prediction errors, respectively. We demonstrate that value neurons are robust and transferable across diverse datasets and models, and provide causal evidence that they encode reward-related information. Finally, we show applications of the reward subsystem: value neurons serve as effective predictors of model confidence, and dopamine neurons can function as a process reward model (PRM) to guide inference-time search.

We propose NEURONA, a neuro-symbolic framework for fMRI decoding and concept grounding in neural activity. Leveraging image- and video-based fMRI question-answering datasets, NEURONA learns to decode interacting concepts from visual stimuli based on patterns of fMRI responses, integrating symbolic reasoning and compositional execution with fMRI grounding across brain regions. We demonstrate that incorporating structural priors (e.g., compositional predicate-argument dependencies between concepts) into the decoding process significantly improves both decoding accuracy over precise queries, and notably, generalization to unseen queries at test time. With NEURONA, we highlight neuro-symbolic frameworks as promising tools for understanding neural activity.

Scientific discoveries often hinge on synthesizing decades of research, a task that potentially outstrips human information processing capacities. Large language models (LLMs) offer a solution. LLMs trained on the vast scientific literature could potentially integrate noisy yet interrelated findings to forecast novel results better than human experts. To evaluate this possibility, we created BrainBench, a forward-looking benchmark for predicting neuroscience results. We find that LLMs surpass experts in predicting experimental outcomes. BrainGPT, an LLM we tuned on the neuroscience literature, performed better yet. Like human experts, when LLMs were confident in their predictions, they were more likely to be correct, which presages a future where humans and LLMs team together to make discoveries. Our approach is not neuroscience-specific and is transferable to other knowledge-intensive endeavors.

We tackle the challenge of rapidly adapting an agent's behavior to solve spatiotemporally continuous problems in novel settings. Animals exhibit extraordinary abilities to adapt to new contexts, a capacity unmatched by artificial systems. Instead of focusing on generalization through deep reinforcement learning, we propose viewing behavior as the physical manifestation of a search procedure, where robust problem-solving emerges from an exhaustive search across all possible behaviors. Surprisingly, this can be done efficiently using online modification of a cognitive graph that guides action, challenging the predominant view that exhaustive search in continuous spaces is impractical. We describe an algorithm that implicitly enumerates behaviors by regulating the tight feedback loop between execution of behaviors and mutation of the graph, and provide a neural implementation based on Hebbian learning and a novel high-dimensional harmonic representation inspired by entorhinal cortex. By framing behavior as search, we provide a mathematically simple and biologically plausible model for real-time behavioral adaptation, successfully solving a variety of continuous state-space navigation problems. This framework not only offers a flexible neural substrate for other applications but also presents a powerful paradigm for understanding adaptive behavior. Our results suggest potential advancements in developmental learning and unsupervised skill acquisition, paving the way for autonomous robots to master complex skills in data-sparse environments demanding flexibility.

We investigate the extent to which an LLM's hidden-state geometry can be recovered from its behavior in psycholinguistic experiments. Across eight instruction-tuned transformer models, we run two experimental paradigms -- similarity-based forced choice and free association -- over a shared 5,000-word vocabulary, collecting 17.5M+ trials to build behavior-based similarity matrices. Using representational similarity analysis, we compare behavioral geometries to layerwise hidden-state similarity and benchmark against FastText, BERT, and cross-model consensus. We find that forced-choice behavior aligns substantially more with hidden-state geometry than free association. In a held-out-words regression, behavioral similarity (especially forced choice) predicts unseen hidden-state similarities beyond lexical baselines and cross-model consensus, indicating that behavior-only measurements retain recoverable information about internal semantic geometry. Finally, we discuss implications for the ability of behavioral tasks to uncover hidden cognitive states.

Memory is the process of encoding, storing, and retrieving information, allowing humans to retain experiences, knowledge, skills, and facts over time, and serving as the foundation for growth and effective interaction with the world. It plays a crucial role in shaping our identity, making decisions, learning from past experiences, building relationships, and adapting to changes. In the era of large language models (LLMs), memory refers to the ability of an AI system to retain, recall, and use information from past interactions to improve future responses and interactions. Although previous research and reviews have provided detailed descriptions of memory mechanisms, there is still a lack of a systematic review that summarizes and analyzes the relationship between the memory of LLM-driven AI systems and human memory, as well as how we can be inspired by human memory to construct more powerful memory systems. To achieve this, in this paper, we propose a comprehensive survey on the memory of LLM-driven AI systems. In particular, we first conduct a detailed analysis of the categories of human memory and relate them to the memory of AI systems. Second, we systematically organize existing memory-related work and propose a categorization method based on three dimensions (object, form, and time) and eight quadrants. Finally, we illustrate some open problems regarding the memory of current AI systems and outline possible future directions for memory in the era of large language models.

Language models are increasingly being deployed for general problem solving across a wide range of tasks, but are still confined to token-level, left-to-right decision-making processes during inference. This means they can fall short in tasks that require exploration, strategic lookahead, or where initial decisions play a pivotal role. To surmount these challenges, we introduce a new framework for language model inference, Tree of Thoughts (ToT), which generalizes over the popular Chain of Thought approach to prompting language models, and enables exploration over coherent units of text (thoughts) that serve as intermediate steps toward problem solving. ToT allows LMs to perform deliberate decision making by considering multiple different reasoning paths and self-evaluating choices to decide the next course of action, as well as looking ahead or backtracking when necessary to make global choices. Our experiments show that ToT significantly enhances language models' problem-solving abilities on three novel tasks requiring non-trivial planning or search: Game of 24, Creative Writing, and Mini Crosswords. For instance, in Game of 24, while GPT-4 with chain-of-thought prompting only solved 4% of tasks, our method achieved a success rate of 74%. Code repo with all prompts: https://github.com/ysymyth/tree-of-thought-llm.

Tool-integrated reasoning (TIR) offers a direct way to extend thinking models beyond the limits of text-only reasoning. Paradoxically, we observe that tool-enabled evaluation can degrade reasoning performance even when the strong thinking models make almost no actual tool calls. In this paper, we investigate how to inject natural tool-use behavior into a strong thinking model without sacrificing its no-tool reasoning ability, and present a comprehensive TIR recipe. We highlight that (i) the effectiveness of TIR supervised fine-tuning (SFT) hinges on the learnability of teacher trajectories, which should prioritize problems inherently suited for tool-augmented solutions; (ii) controlling the proportion of tool-use trajectories could mitigate the catastrophic forgetting of text-only reasoning capacity; (iii) optimizing for pass@k and response length instead of training loss could maximize TIR SFT gains while preserving headroom for reinforcement learning (RL) exploration; (iv) a stable RL with verifiable rewards (RLVR) stage, built upon suitable SFT initialization and explicit safeguards against mode collapse, provides a simple yet remarkably effective solution. When applied to Qwen3 thinking models at 4B and 30B scales, our recipe yields models that achieve state-of-the-art performance in a wide range of benchmarks among open-source models, such as 96.7% and 99.2% on AIME 2025 for 4B and 30B, respectively.

Probabilistic mental simulation is thought to play a key role in human reasoning, planning, and prediction, yet the demands of simulation in complex environments exceed realistic human capacity limits. A theory with growing evidence is that people simulate using simplified representations of the environment that abstract away from irrelevant details, but it is unclear how people determine these simplifications efficiently. Here, we present a "Just-in-Time" framework for simulation-based reasoning that demonstrates how such representations can be constructed online with minimal added computation. The model uses a tight interleaving of simulation, visual search, and representation modification, with the current simulation guiding where to look and visual search flagging objects that should be encoded for subsequent simulation. Despite only ever encoding a small subset of objects, the model makes high-utility predictions. We find strong empirical support for this account over alternative models in a grid-world planning task and a physical reasoning task across a range of behavioral measures. Together, these results offer a concrete algorithmic account of how people construct reduced representations to support efficient mental simulation.

Recent advances in fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) with reinforcement learning (RL) have shown promising improvements in complex reasoning tasks, particularly when paired with chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. However, these successes have been largely demonstrated on large-scale models with billions of parameters, where a strong pretraining foundation ensures effective initial exploration. In contrast, RL remains challenging for tiny LLMs with 1 billion parameters or fewer because they lack the necessary pretraining strength to explore effectively, often leading to suboptimal reasoning patterns. This work introduces a novel intrinsic motivation approach that leverages episodic memory to address this challenge, improving tiny LLMs in CoT reasoning tasks. Inspired by human memory-driven learning, our method leverages successful reasoning patterns stored in memory while allowing for controlled exploration to generate novel responses. Intrinsic rewards are computed efficiently using a kNN-based episodic memory, allowing the model to discover new reasoning strategies while quickly adapting to effective past solutions. Experiments on fine-tuning GSM8K and AI-MO datasets demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances smaller LLMs' sample efficiency and generalization capability, making RL-based reasoning improvements more accessible in low-resource settings.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.